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Public Choice  begins with the observation that in politics, as in economics, 
individuals and institutions compete for scarce resources and that, therefore, the same 
methods of analyses used by economists to explain the behaviour of consumers and 
producers might also serve well to explain the behaviour of governments and other 
(allegedly) “public-spirited” organisations . As Tullock (1988) succinctly put it, 
Public Choice is "the invasion of politics by economics".  Public Choice derives its 
rationale from the fact that, in many areas, 'political' and 'economic' considerations 
interact so that a proper understanding of issues in one field requires a complementary 
understanding of issues in the other. Although the incursion of the analytical methods 
of economics into political science - which is the hall-mark of  Public Choice - began 
in the 1950s, it was not until at least three decades later that the trickle became a 
flood. This chapter provides an overview of this field. 
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 1.  Introduction 
Public Choice  begins with the observation that in politics, as in economics, 
individuals and institutions compete for scarce resources and that, therefore, the same 
methods of analyses used by economists to explain the behaviour of consumers and 
producers might also serve well to explain the behaviour of governments and other 
(allegedly) “public-spirited” organisations . As Tullock (1988) succinctly put it, 
Public Choice is "the invasion of politics by economics".  Public Choice derives its 
rationale from the fact that, in many areas, 'political' and 'economic' considerations 
interact so that a proper understanding of issues in one field requires a complementary 
understanding of issues in the other. Although the incursion of the analytical methods 
of economics into political science - which is the hall-mark of  Public Choice - began 
in the 1950s, it was not until at least three decades later that the trickle became a 
flood.   
 
Much of economic activity is carried out in a market environment where the 
protagonists are households, on the one hand, and firms, on the other.  Both sides, 
according to the rules of economic analysis, have clear objectives: households want to 
consume in quantities that will maximise their utility and firms want to produce in 
quantities that will maximise their profits.  The market allows households to reveal 
their preferences to firms and for firms to meet these preferences in such a way that 
the separate decisions of millions of economic agents, acting independently of one 
another, are reconciled.   
 
However, a significant part of economic activity involves the state
1
 and is, therefore, 
carried out in a non-market environment.  One reason for the existence of such non-
market activities is the existence of 'public goods' or goods supplied by government to 
its citizens.  Of course, the scope of non-market activity depends on the country being 
considered: in Sweden, a range of services - provision of child-care facilities, health, 
education - are provided by government; in the USA these services are provided by 
the market. 
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Another reason for government involvement in the economy is due to the fact that 
markets do not always operate efficiently.  When they do not, because of 'market 
imperfections' leading to 'market failure',  governments have to step in to correct such 
inefficiencies.  These interventions may take the form of corrective taxes and 
subsidies and/or it may take the form of regulation and directives.  At the 
macroeconomic level, governments are responsible for stabilising, and promoting, its 
performance with respect to a number of economic variables: unemployment, 
inflation, the exchange rate, national income etc..   
 
But, a third, and important, reason for governmental actions and policies is self-
interest. At its most basic level, the problem that democratically elected governments 
face is of acting in a manner consistent with what its citizens desire. People express 
their political demands through their votes; if there is a mismatch between the demand 
for, and supply of, outcomes then the political market will take 'corrective action' 
analogous to the corrective action that economic markets take when the demand for, 
and supply of, goods and services is not in harmony. As Tullock (1976) observed, 
"voters and customers are essentially the same people.  Mr. Smith buys and votes; he 
is the same man in the supermarket and in the voting booth".  In the case of the 
economic market, corrective action takes the form of price changes; in the political 
market, corrective action takes the form of government changes, effected by voting 
out one party (or coalition of parties) from power and voting in another. 
Consequently, an important perspective that Public Choice offers is that  public 
policies are formulated and implemented partly for the social benefits they might 
yield but, partly also, for the benefits they might bring to the policy-making bodies 
themselves.      
 
It was dissatisfaction with the inability and failure of traditional approaches to the 
analysis of public policy  methods to address basic issues in political economy that led 
to the emergence of the new discipline of 'public choice'.  These basic issues were 
inter alia: what factors influence votes? what is the 'best' system of voting for 
ensuring a correct revelation of preferences? can the actions of individuals be made 
                                                                                                                             
1
 Between one-third to one-half of GDP in most countries of the OECD is generated through the 
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more effective when they act collectively? what is the role of re-election concerns in 
determining the supply of government output? is there the possibility of conflict 
between different departments of government? The new discipline of public choice 
explicitly addressed these issues and its analysis of these issues was explicitly 
predicated on the assumption that the behaviour of individuals and of public 
institutions was motivated by self-interest.    
 
In so doing, public choice theory forcefully reminds political scientists of the view 
held by Kautilya, Machiavelli and Hobbes that many, ostensibly public-spirited, 
policies may be motivated by self-interest; with similar force it reminds economists of 
the unreality of basing analysis of public policy on the assumption that the state is a 
'benevolent dictator' acting so as to do 'the greatest good for the greatest number'.  
More generally, the arrival of public choice signalled a shift from a 'normative' to a 
'positive' analysis of the political process: the subject matter of public choice was 
what political actors actually do, not what they should do.  
 
The intellectual foundations of public choice theory lie in five seminal texts: Arrow 
(1951); Downs (1957); and Olson (1965); Tullock (1967); and Nordhaus (1975).  
Each of these is discussed below. 
2. Voting Procedures 
A major contribution of public choice theory has been to expand our knowledge and 
understanding of voting procedures.  The voting problem is one of selecting, on the 
basis of the declared preferences of the electorate, one out of an available set of 
options.  Stated in this manner, the voting problem is akin to the problem of social 
choice where individual preferences are in order to arrive at a notion of 'social 
welfare'.   
 
For example, every individual in society may rank different 'projects' according to the 
net benefits that they expect to obtain.  The problem is that such a ranking by 
individuals may not lead to a social ranking, that is to a ranking to which all 
individuals in society would subscribe.  For example with three individuals (A, B and 
                                                                                                                             
activities of government. 
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C) and three projects (X, Y and Z) suppose the rankings are as given in the table 
below: 
Table 1: Cyclical Social Preference under Pair-wise Voting 
Preference Ordering A B C 
First Choice X Z Y 
Second Choice Y X Z 
Third Choice Z Y X 
 
Then in a sequence of pair-wise comparisons: X versus Y, Y wins since both A and  B 
prefer X to Y; Y versus Z, Y wins, since both A and C prefer Y to Z; X versus Z, Z 
wins since both B and C prefer Z to X.  The implied social ordering is that X is 
preferred to Y; Y is preferred to Z; but Z is preferred to X!  The cyclical nature of 
social preferences arises from the fact that the social ordering is not transitive or, in 
the language of electoral studies, there is no Condorcet winner.  Indeed, the problem 
of social choice is not unlike that of voting behaviour: in both cases the issue is one of 
translating individual preferences into an agenda for collective action that faithfully 
represents these preferences.  This was a point noted by Black (1948).   
 
The Impossibility Theorem: Arrow(1951) 
More generally, the possibility of intransitivity in social rankings – of the sort 
described above – is not necessarily the result of obtaining such rankings from pair-
wise majority rule voting; intransitivity can occur from the application of any rule for 
creating social rankings which satisfies certain minimal properties.  This was 
demonstrated by Arrow (1951), in his celebrated „Impossibility Theorem‟, when he 
showed that any social rule which satisfied a minimal set of fairness conditions could 
produce an intransitive ranking when two or more persons had to choose from three or 
more projects.  
 
These conditions were the axioms of: unrestricted domain (individuals had transitive 
preferences over all the policy alternatives); Pareto choice (if one project made 
someone better off than another project, without making anyone worse off, then it 
would be the socially preferred choice); independence (the ranking of two choices 
should not depend on what the other choices were); non-dictatorship (the social 
ordering should not be imposed). 
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Arrow's result rendered all democratic rules of collective action suspect - the idea that 
the state could act in terms of a well-defined social interest by aggregating over 
individual preferences (Bergson, 1938) was now rendered invalid.  The work of Black 
(1948) and Arrow (1951) work also drew attention to the potentially unstable nature 
of majority coalitions.  Although the problem of cyclical voting had been known of 
since Condorcet (see below), Black's and Arrow's work brought out its relevance to 
political science.  Variations and extensions of Arrow‟s (1951) result have taken the 
form of investigating whether the theorem would continue to be true when one or the 
other of these axioms was weakened.  One line of investigation that has been 
extensively followed is to relax the requirement that social choice must be based on 
social ordering (complete, reflexive and transitive).  Another has been to restrict 
individual preferences to „single-peaked‟ preferences2: Arrow showed that if 
individual preferences are single-peaked and the number of voters is odd, then 
majority decision will yield transitive social preference
3
.  
 
The Social Welfare Function 
One property that may be dropped from Arrow‟s list of desirable properties (see 
footnote) is the requirement that the social preferences between two alternatives 
depends only on the individual ranking of these alternatives.  Define for individual i, 
the utility associated with alternative X as ( )iU X  and define the social welfare 
associated with X as: 1( ) ( ( )... ( ))NW X W U X U X .  The „aggregating function‟ W(X) 
is called a social welfare function (SWF). Using the SWF, the socially optimal point 
for an economy may be identified as that point on an economy‟s utility possibility 
frontier which yields the highest level of social welfare (Figure 1, below).    
A particular form of the social welfare function is additive: 
1
( ) ( )
N
i
i
W X U X

 .  This 
is sometimes referred to as a utilitarian SWF
4
.  When the SWF is additive,  X is 
socially preferred to Y if:  
                                            
2
 So that the alternatives are arranged in a line so that everyone‟s intensity of preference has only one 
peak. 
3
 This result earlier discussed in Black (1948) cements the relationship between voting theory and 
social choice theory.  
4
 A generalisation of this form is the weighted sum-of-utilities: ( ) ( )
i i
W X U X  
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 ( ) ( ) or  ( ) ( )
N N
i i
i i
W X W Y U X U Y    (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inequality and Social Welfare 
In both industrialised and developing countries, the making of public policy is 
underpinned by tension between the conflicting demands of income growth and 
income equality.  This tension has been greatly exacerbated by globalisation and the 
policies of „economic liberalistion‟ that have followed in its wake.  A consequence of 
liberalisation has been a growth in inequality: between individuals, through a higher 
relative return to education and skills that are in international demand; between urban 
and rural locations as job opportunities gravitate towards big cities; between regions, 
as some states successfully climb the globalisation bandwagon (Andhra Pradesh; 
Karnataka) and others do not (Assam; Bihar; Orissa).  It is important, therefore, to 
understand how the competing demands of growth and distribution affect social 
welfare.  
 
Suppose there are N persons (indexed, i=1…N) such that that yi represents the income 
of person i  and that U(yi) represents the utility associated with his income.  Assume 
that: ( ) 0 and ( ) 0i iU y U y    so that the utility functions are concave functions of 
income (that is, exhibit strictly diminishing marginal utility).  Now suppose that social 
welfare is additive in the individual utilities:  
 
1
( )
N
i
i
W U y

  (2) 
 
 
Utility of B 
 
 
 
                                            Welfare Maximisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         Utility of A 
Figure 1 
Welfare Maximisation with a SWF 
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Let x={xi} and z={zi} be two income vectors such that the Lorenz curve for x lies 
entirely inside the Lorenz curve for z.  This means that, on the basis of Lorenz-based 
inequality measures
5
, the distribution associated with z is more unequal than that 
associated with x.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      Figure 2: Lorenz-Dominance 
 
Then, by Atkinson‟s (1970) theorem on Lorenz ranking, W(x)>W(z).  In other words, 
if one distribution was “more equal” than another, then there would be a higher level 
of social welfare associated with that distribution; conversely, if for two distributions, 
x and z, W(x)>W(z), then x Lorenz-dominates z (that is, the Lorenz curve for x lies 
entirely inside the Lorenz curve for z: Figure 2).  
 
Let I(y) be an inequality index, defined over the vector of incomes y, which takes 
values between 0 and1, and which has the property of mean-independence.  This last 
property means that the value of the inequality index is unchanged if all incomes are 
scaled up (or down) by the same factor.  Then if (y) is mean income, the welfare 
function W of equation (2) may be written as (Sen, 1998): 
 (1 )W I   (3) 
Equation (3) implies that in evaluating social welfare the contribution of the size of 
the pie () needs to be adjusted downwards by the inequality in its distribution (I).  It 
follows that  social welfare could be higher with a lower, than with a higher, mean 
income, provided that the lower income was sufficiently more equally distributed than 
the higher income. 
                                            
5
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                                          Z 
                                            
             X 
 8 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These ideas are illustrated in Figure 3, above.  The line LM shows the various 
distributions between 1 and 2 for a given level of income OE.  At the point C on LM, 
both persons get the same income.  If the actual distribution is at point A, then the 
social welfare associated with this is W1.  A lower level of income, OB which is 
equally distributed between 1 and 2 yields the same level of welfare as the higher 
level OE distributed according to A.  Atkinson (1970) termed OB (<OE ) as the 
“equally distributed equivalent income”: it is the income which, if equally distributed, 
would be welfare-equivalent to a higher income, distributed unequally. 
 
The above view of the welfare-reducing effects of inequality raises two questions.  
First, by how much should welfare be reduced in the face of inequality?  Second, is 
there a link between average income and the degree of inequality in its distribution 
such that more equality means less income? 
 
Atkinson (1970) showed that the answer to the first question depended on society‟s 
“aversion to inequality”: the same distribution of income would generate different 
values of the inequality index, I, in equation (57), depending upon ones aversion to 
inequality.  If society had a high degree of tolerance towards inequality (for example, 
 
 
Income of 2 
 
 
 
 
                       W1 
            L 
 
 
 
                                                       K 
 
                                             C        
 
                                 B 
                                
 
                                                                    A 
                                                                              W1 
 
 
                
               0                    D     E                    F           M 
                                                                                              Income of 1 
Figure 3 
The Equally-Distributed Equivalent Income 
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the USA), the value of the inequality index, and hence the reduction in welfare, would 
be small; on the other hand, if society was intolerant of inequality (for example, 
Sweden) the value of the inequality index, and hence the reduction in welfare, would 
be large.    
 
On the second question, Browning and Johnson (1984) argued that reducing income 
inequality was not a costless process because the appropriate policies for effecting this 
reduction produced a misallocation of resources: using a micro dataset for the US, 
they showed that the marginal cost of reducing inequality could be quite high.  
Borooah (2002) showed, in the context of a theoretical model, that the equity gains 
that followed from Fair Employment regulation (or, as in India, from job reservations)  
needed to be offset against the efficiency losses to which such regulation gave rise.    
 
Desirable Voting Systems 
The relevance of the work of Black (1948) and of Arrow (1951) to the voting problem 
lay in attempting to identify: (a) the desirable conditions that any voting system 
should satisfy and (b) a voting system that satisfied these conditions.  May (1952) 
showed that when there were only two alternatives, majority voting was 
unambiguously the best.   The problem was to extend this result when there were 
more than two alternatives.  In such situations, different voting systems could be 
constructed, all of which seemed fair and reasonable - and all of which, in the event of 
two alternatives, yielded majority rule - but, which nevertheless yielded different 
outcomes.   
 
One possible system is plurality ('first-past-the-post') in which each voter votes for 
exactly one option and the option receiving the largest number of votes wins.  One 
problem with this system is that it is based on an incomplete revelation of preferences: 
there is no requirement for a voter to rank the options for which he (she) did not vote.  
As Table 2 shows, on the basis of votes cast by 60 voters, A wins by plurality, yet A 
would lose against B alone (25 to 35) and against C alone (23 to 37). 
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Table 2: Plurality Voting 
 23 voters 19 voters 16 voters 2 voters 
1
st
 preference  A B C C 
2
nd
 preference C C B A 
3
rd
 preference B A A B 
  
This then points to a second defect of plurality voting which is the fact that it is 
subject to agenda manipulation and that the presence, or absence, of options - even if 
those options cannot win - can affect the outcome.  In the Table 2, if either B or C was 
“persuaded” not to stand, the other would win. 
 
The alternative is for each voter to rank the alternatives in order of preference (as in 
Table 2 above) and then the appropriate electoral rule would aggregate these 
individual rankings into an overall ranking. Such a procedure is termed an 'ordinal 
procedure'.  One possible electoral rule, based on an ordinal procedure, is the Borda 
count:  in the presence of N options, assign N points to the option ranked first, N-1 
points to the option ranked second and finally one point to the option ranked last.  A 
Borda count applied to the data in Table 2 sees C a comfortable winner with 138 
points, A coming second with 105 points and B finishing last with 91 points.  The 
Borda count method, however, is also susceptible to false revelation of preferences: 
voters, irrespective of their true preferences, would be inclined to give the lowest 
preference vote to the candidate they thought was most threatening to their preferred 
candidates electoral prospects (Miller, 1987).      
 
Both plurality and ordinal procedures may be multistage procedures - so that the 
chosen option only emerges after successive rounds of voting - by combining either of 
them with the possibility of elimination.  Thus, plurality plus run-off eliminates all but 
the two strongest candidates in the earlier rounds leaving a simple run-off between the 
two candidates for the final round.   An alternative is to eliminate in each round the 
weakest candidate and to choose a candidate after N-1 rounds of voting.  Although 
both these voting procedures - and variants thereof - are reasonable they don't 
necessarily lead to the same outcome.  For example, in Table 3, taken from Miller 
(1987): C wins under plurality; A, with 50 points, wins under a Borda count; and B 
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wins against C either under plurality with run-off or with successive elimination of 
the weakest candidate. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Multi-Stage Voting 
 4 voters 4 voters 2 voters 9 voters 
1
st
 preference A B B C 
2
nd
 preference B A D D 
3
rd
 preference D D A A 
4
th
 preference C C C B 
  
The way out, as proposed by Condorcet in 1785, was to have a pair-wise comparison 
of alternatives, choosing, at each comparison, the alternative with greater support.  An 
alternative that wins over all the others is then selected the preferred option and is 
termed the Condorcet winner.  Thus, in Table 2, the Condorcet winner C beats A, 37-
23 and beats B, 41-19.  However, as Table 1 showed, and as Table 4 shows, a 
Condorcet winner need not exist: in Table 3 demonstrates the phenomenon of 
'cyclical voting' - also termed the 'paradox of voting' - whereby A beats B (33-27); B 
beats C (42-18); and C beats A (35-25). 
 
Table 4: The Paradox of Voting 
 23 voters 17 voters 2 voters 10 voters 8 voters 
1
st
 preference A B B C C 
2
nd
 preference B C A A B 
3
rd
 preference C A C B A 
 
 
Single- and Multi-Peaked Preferences 
The question, therefore, is whether it is possible to specify conditions under which 
cyclical voting will not occur.  This was addressed by Black (1948 and 1952) using 
the concept of 'single-peaked' preferences.  Suppose that the set of alternatives can be 
represented in one dimension - for example, choice between different levels of public 
expenditure - and suppose that for each voter there is a preferred level of expenditure 
- which may be different for different voters - such that preferences drop 
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monotonically for levels on either side of this optimum.  In such a case (see Figure 4) 
voter preferences are said to be single-peaked.  This means that the greater the 
distance of the actual position from the unique utility maximising position, the lower 
the level of utility.   
 
Under single-peaked preferences, the median voter decides in the sense that the 
preferred choice of the median voter is the Condorcet winner.  This result is illustrated 
in Figure 4 (taken from Mueller, 2003) in which there are five voters – voters 1 to 5- 
each with single-peaked preferences.  In a pair-wise contest, the preferred choice of 
the median voter, Voter 3, will beat the preferred choice of all other voters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, when the options before the voters concern the type of expenditure, rather 
than the amount of expenditure, multiple peaked expenditures cannot be ruled out.  
For example (see Connolly and Munro, 1999), suppose three parties are trying to 
decide on the best way of spending Rs. 100 crore.  The options are: buy some figher 
planes for the Air Force; spend it on a dam; embark on a major programme of 
improved sanitation.  The three parties – BJP, Congress, CPM – set out their 
preferences as follows: 
 
 
 
 
    Utility            Voter 1       Voter 2            Voter 3            Voter 4      Voter 5 
                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
                                                                                                          Amount of  Public Expenditure 
Figure 4: 
The Median Voter Decides 
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Table 5: Multi-Peaked Preferences 
Party 
Ranking 
BJP CPM Congres 
1 Fighter Plane Dam Sanitation 
2 Dam Sanitation Fighter Plane 
3 Sanitation Fighter Plane Dam 
 
Now the Congress Party exhibits multi-peaked preferences, while both the BJP and 
the CPM have single-peaked preferences (see Figure 5).  The consequence of multi-
peaked preferences is that in binary comparisons: plane beats dam (BJP + Congress 
against CPM); dam beats sanitation (BJP + CPM against sanitation); but sanitation 
beats plane (Congress + CPM versus BJP).  A very important lesson from multi-
peaked preferences is that the outcome depends very much on the order in which the 
options are voted for.  So, if the first vote was dam versus sanitation, the dam would 
win; if the next vote was between plane versus dam, the plane would win and Rs. 100 
crores would be spent on the plane.  However, if the first vote was plane versus 
sanitation, sanitation would win; if the next vote was sanitation versus the dam, again 
the dam would win and Rs. 100crore would be spent on the dam.  So astute 
chairmanship of meetings is important to ensure the “desired” outcome! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Ranking 
 
                      1            BJP 
                                                                   CPM 
 
 
                               Congress 
                      2 
 
 
 
                      3 
 
                               
                               Plane            Dam          Sanitation 
 
Figure 5: 
Multi- and Single-Peaked Preferences 
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However, if instead of Table 5, preferences were represented by Table 6, then the 
preferences of the Congress party would also be single-peaked: this is illustrated by 
the dotted line in Figure 5.  Under single-peaked preferences: the dam is preferred to 
sanitation (BJP + CPM versus Congress); sanitation is preferred to the plane (CPM + 
Congress versus the BJP); and the dam is preferred to the plane (CPM + Congress 
versus the BJP).  Preferences are, therefore, transitive. 
 
Table 6: Single-Peaked Preferences 
Party 
Ranking 
BJP CPM Congres 
1 Fighter Plane Dam Sanitation 
2 Dam Sanitation Dam 
3 Sanitation Fighter Plane Fighter Plane 
 
The notion of single-peaked preferences has a certain plausibility in terms of single-
issue politics.  Although the notion of a single-peak can be extended to 
multidimensional issues, the results are far more complex and will not be reported 
here. 
3.  How Voters Decide 
Downs' (1957)  book is regarded as "one of the cornerstones of contemporary rational 
actor theory" (Monroe, 1991) and, not coincidentally, the theory of voting contained 
within it accords most closely with standard economic theory.  The fundamental 
hypothesis of Downs (1957, p. 28) was that “parties formulate policies in order to win 
elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies”.  As Mueller (2003) notes, 
his study was the first to explore systematically the implications of this assumption 
and the literature has evolved around the foundations that he laid.  In a Downsian 
world, each voter was rational in the sense that he (she) voted for the party that was 
believed to offer him (her) the greatest benefits.  Party manifestos were an important 
way by which voters evaluated these benefits and consequently, for Downs, such 
manifestos were a means of winning elections.   
 
But because collecting information on parties was expensive, no voter would attempt 
a comprehensive evaluation.  Instead, each voter would confine his (her) evaluation to 
those areas where party differences, in the voter's view, were significantly large. In 
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summary, therefore, Downs made a seminal contribution towards understanding the 
nature of party competition, rational ignorance and spatial voting.   
 
The Median Voter Theorem 
A stylised fact that is often cited in discussions of electoral outcomes is that electoral 
competition between parties engenders centrist policies.  This stylised fact is due to an 
important result first discovered by Hotelling (1929) and enshrined as the Median 
Voter Theorem.  Hotelling showed that if there were two identical ice-cream sellers 
on a beach and that if customers were spread uniformly along the beach, the seller 
closet to the centre of the beach would get the most business since he would be closest 
to the largest number of customers.  Since both sellers would realise this, they would 
locate themselves, side by side, in the middle of the beach.  Hotelling‟s result can be 
applied as a spatial theory of electoral competition in which political parties seek to 
locate themselves at a point where they maximise the custom of voters who are strung 
out along an ideological spectrum.  
 
If there are a large number of voters, each of whom distils the complexity of issues 
facing them into a personal ideological position (extreme left; left; centrist; right; 
extreme right), then the Median Voter Theorem can be used to predict outcomes in a 
two-party democracy (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Voters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    L     X    M      R        Ideological Position  
                                                     of Parties  
Figure 6: 
Median Voter Outcomes  
Under Two-Party Competition 
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Suppose that voters are distributed along the spectrum of ideological positions from 
'left' to 'right' as shown in Figure 6.  Then, if the initial party positions are L and R, R 
wins: R obtains votes from those to the right of R as well as votes from those between 
X and R, where X is the mid-point between L and R; L receives votes from voters to 
its left as well as the votes of those between L and X.  As things stand, R wins the 
majority of votes and is elected.  However,  L can increase its vote, by adopting a less 
„extreme‟ left-wing position and moving closer to the centre of the ideological 
spectrum.  The same option is available to R: it too can gain votes by adopting a less 
„extreme‟ right-wing position.  Inter-party competition will then ensure that each 
party will occupy the 'middle ground' that is adopt the ideological position of the 
median voter.  Under the conditions of the median voter model, democracy favours 
moderate parties and penalises parties which adopt extreme positions.    
4. Interest Groups and Collective Action 
 
One way that people can reveal their preferences is by voting; another way is by 
associating with like-minded persons to form 'interest groups'.  Some of these groups 
seek to advance the objectives of their members: for example, professional 
associations (doctors; dentists); caste associations (All-India Kurmi Association); 
business associations (Chamber of Commerce); and trade unions fall into this 
category.  Others seek to influence public policy or outcomes, with respect to a 
specific agenda, by lobbying government for favourable treatment: for example, 
Medha Patkar and the Narmada Bacahao Andolan.   
 
The problem about collective action is that it does not follow from the fact that a 
group of people have a common interest that they will form an interest group and bear 
the cost of collective action.  Olson (1965) pointed out that collective action is vitiated 
by the 'free rider' problem of public economics: an economically rational person 
would not participate in (and share the costs of) an interest group because he (she) 
cannot be excluded from any benefits that may accrue from the activities of the group.  
Consequently, a great deal of potential collective action will not, in fact, materialise.  
This view - emphasising as it did the primacy of the individual -  flew in the face of 
those in political science who regarded organised groups as the basic units in politics.   
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Olson (op. cit.) argued that two conditions were required for collective action to 
occur.  First, the number of persons acting collectively should be relatively small so 
that if one person decided to 'free ride', the group would be rendered ineffective and 
no benefits would accrue.  Second, the group should have access to 'selective 
incentives' by which it could penalise those who have not, and reward those who 
have, borne the cost of collective action.  Trade union 'closed shop' arrangements, by 
which only members can get jobs, is one example of selective incentives.  Selective 
incentives are less often available to potential entrants and to low-income groups.  
Thus it is the employed, rather than the unemployed that are organised, and it is the 
professional groups - doctors, teachers, lawyers - that are better organised than 
unskilled occupations.  For this reason,  Olson (1982) observed that, in the main, 
collective action would be anti-egalitarian and pro-establishment.  Olson's work 
elevated the "free rider" problem to a central position in political science.  In 
Mueller's (2003) view, "the free rider problem pervades all of collective choice".  
 
5. Collective Action and Rent-Seeking 
One of the reasons that collective action would be retrogressive is that it would lead to 
'rent-seeking'.  Tullock (1967) was the first to analyse rent seeking.  It is a well known 
proposition in economics that monopoly price will be higher (and output lower) than 
price (and output) under competitive conditions.  This enables a monopolist to earn 
'rent', equivalent to the loss in consumers' surplus from not producing the competitive 
output at the competitive price.  The amount of this rent is the area of the triangle 
ABD in Figure 7, below.   
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Figure 7: 
Welfare Losses from Monopoly 
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The lines EB (and its extension) and ED (and its extension) in Figure 7, above, 
represent, respectively, the average and the marginal revenue curves of the 
monopolist, while the line FB (and its extension) represents the monopolist‟s  
marginal cost curve.  The equilibrium price-output combination of the monopolist is 
given by the equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost and is pM (price) and YM 
(output): this is the price-output combination that maximises monopoly profits.  On 
the other hand, the competitive price-output combination is given by the equality of 
marginal cost and average revenue: pC (price) and YC (output). 
 
The loss in consumers’ surplus in moving from competition to monopoly is pMABpC 
= pMAGpC + AGD.  On the other hand, the gain in producer’s surplus, in moving 
from competition to monopoly, is FpMAD - pcBD = pMAGpC – DGB.  So, the net loss 
to society due to monopoly is (pMAGpC + AGD) –( pMAGpC – DGB) = AGD + DGB 
= ABD.   The area of the triangle ABD – whose area measures the net loss from 
monopoly – is known as the deadweight loss from monopoly (Harberger, 1954). 
 
If  a producer could persuade government (politicians, bureaucrats) to establish a 
monopoly in an industry by raising barriers to entry (requiring new entrants to obtain 
permission from the government to set up in that industry) then he would benefit 
since, as we have seen, producer‟s surplus is greater under monopoly than under 
competition.  Under a licence raj, society transfers resources equal to the area of the 
triangle ABD from consumers to the monopolist.  This is the rent accruing to the 
producer from being the sole producer in that industry; he would not receive this if he 
was operating in a competitive framework in which he was but one of many 
producers.   
 
In order to obtain this rent, the monopolist would be prepared to invest an amount just 
about equal to the amount of the rent.  Suppose the monopolist calculates that this rent 
is Rs. 1 crore.  Then he is prepared to spend up to Rs. 1 crore in persuading policy 
makers (through ways which need not be spelled out in detail here) to establish a 
monopoly in the industry.  Hence the true cost of monopoly is not just the loss in 
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consumers' surplus but also the total resources invested in 'rent-seeking activities'.  
Such rent-seeking activities may take the form of airline cartels lobbying for a 
monopoly over a particular route; less obviously, it may also take the form of a trade 
union lobbying a firm for 'single union' recognition.  More broadly one can say that 
when rents are to be earned, business and government no longer keep their distance 
from each other  but, instead,  cosy up to each other to their mutual benefit. 
 
In general, one can categorise three types of expenditure (Buchanan, 1980)  associated 
with rent-seeking: (i) expenditure undertaken to secure a monopoly; (ii) the efforts of 
public officials to react to such expenditure; and (iii) third party distortions caused by 
the rent-seeking activity.  For example, in a country with exchange controls, 
commodities may only be imported with an import licence.  Businesses may lobby 
government to be granted such licences and the prospect of earning monopoly rents 
(as businessmen) or of benefiting from the largesse of businessmen (as bureaucrats) 
may dictate the careers of young persons.   For example, a person considering a 
business career may prefer one area of business over another simply because it offers 
the prospect of monopoly rents; at the same time, a person considering a career as a 
civil servant may prefer one branch of the service to another simply because the 
prospects of benefiting from the „generosity‟ of businessmen are greater. 
 
The above analysis raises the question: what is wrong with rent seeking activities?  
The answer is that many rent seeking activities produce profit with producing output.  
Such activities have been described by Bhagwati (1982) as 'directly unproductive 
profit-seeking activities'.  The consequence of contemporary interest in rent-seeking is 
that a great deal of government activity is regarded with suspicion by conservative 
economists: the feeling is much of public sector activity is concerned with providing 
rents to special interest groups and for that, if for no other, reason, small government 
is good government.      
6. The Political Business Cycle 
 
A key proposition in public choice is that is that economic activity tends to revolve 
around election dates, with governments seeking favourable outcomes just before an 
election and postponing unfavourable till just after an election.  The phenomenon to 
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which this gives rise is known as the political business cycle and, since Nordhaus' 
(1975) seminal work in formalising and clarifying the nature of these cycles, this has 
been one of the most researched areas in political economy.   
 
Nordhaus (op. cit.) focused on the short-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment.  In his model, the electorate was only concerned about inflation and 
unemployment and rewarded, or punished, its government according as to whether it 
performed well, or badly, on these two fronts.  But, given the existence of the trade-
off, it was impossible for a government to do well with respect to both inflation and 
unemployment.  Under these circumstances, Nordhaus (op. cit.) showed that there 
would be a political business cycle of the following form: immediately after an 
election, the government raises the unemployment rate and reduces the inflation rate - 
this depresses inflationary expectations and moves the Phillips curve
6
 closer to the 
origin; closer to the election expansionary policies lower the unemployment rate and 
raise the inflation rate but - and this is the crucial point - since the government has 
'invested' by bringing the Phillips curve closer to the origin, the inflation rate rises, but 
not by much.  The government then fights the election on the basis of both a low 
unemployment and a low inflation rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
6
 The Phillips curve, due to Phillips (1954), shows a negative relation between inflation and 
unemployment. The position of the curve depends upon the level of inflationary expectations - lower 
expectations move the curve in closer to the origin. 
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